Czego ciągle o wartościach nie możemy (po)wiedzieć?

  1. Leszek Kopciuch

Abstract

What still cannot be said about values

In this article I present a number of specific questions concerning values, their structure, cognition and their relation with other categories. I discuss problems as follows: 1) the role of emotions in cognition of values; 2) types of obligations in various types of values; 3) obligation and value; 4) unconditional imperative to realise of values; 5) types of values; 6) value and purpose. In phenomenological perspective I propose synthesis axiological emotionalism with axiological rationalism in some „critical axiology”.

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Lectiones & Acroases Philosophicae

5, 2012, z. 2, Metafizyka, fenomenologia, realizm

Pages from 149 to 168

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